In 1650, most European countries suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule, though by the start of World War I many of these same states had centralized institutions and limited government. Using a newly assembled panel data set of per-capita revenues for five of the largest and/or most important players at the timeBritain, France, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Spain -this paper carries out a systematic analysis of political regimes and public revenues over the 17 th to 20 th centuries. The results suggest that both centralized and limited government regimes were associated with significantly higher levels of per-capita revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones, even after controlling for other economic and political factors. Tests for structural breaks reinforce these findings, revealing close relationships between major turning points in revenues series and political transformations.
Introduction
Most European states faced two major fiscal problems in 1650. Nearly all rulers had absolute discretion, enabling them to spend funds as they wished. Rulers often chose personal consumption (e.g. foreign military adventures) over public services that would most benefit society (e.g. roads). Hence, their power had to be limited. Central governments also suffered from divided authority, forcing them to bargain with various local bodies over tax amounts. Localities often attempted to free ride on the contributions of others, leaving states starved for revenues. Thus, fiscal systems had to be centralized, enabling a single authority to gain control over tax collection.
The current political economy literature centers on the problem of absolute discretion, suggesting that limited government is crucial to growth. 1 Yet Acemoglu (2005) shows that there is a strong positive relationship between powerful states -where central governments raise hefty tax sums and play significant economic roles -and per-capita wealth levels. Fiscal fragmentation also remains severe in certain poor parts of the world. Herbst (2000) finds a close relationship between divided fiscal authority and economic stagnation in Africa, for instance. 2 Since dictators also plague many African states, we find a direct link with past European regimes, where rulers had great control over expenditures but less command over revenues.
One useful way to improve our understanding of the effects of absolutism and fragmentation on public finances is to examine the evolution of fiscal systems over the long term, making Europe ideal for study. There we find a clear pattern of economic and political changes from 1650 to 1913, as European states replaced Old Regime institutions with modern ones. Such an inquiry is valuable because countries around the world have implemented European forms of fiscal governance. As mentioned, many of today's developing nations face problems similar to those experienced in earlier periods by European ones.
We find a different sort of one-sidedness when reviewing the historical political economy literature. Hoffman and Norberg (1994) , Bonney (1999) , Bordo and Cortès-Conde (2001) , and others describe fiscal evolution in Europe in intimate detail. Like much of the historical literature, these texts focus on case studies, separating countries by
chapter. Yet there is an implicit cost to this approach: in the absence of rigorous analysis across states, the generality of such findings remains unclear.
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In a well-known paper, North and Weingast (1989) claim that institutional changes with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 enabled the English crown to make a credible commitment to responsible fiscal policies. 4 Thus, the state had better access to credit, because investors had confidence in the ruler's ability to repay loans. Since the time that the article was first published, many other scholars have examined the relationship between limited government and public debt. 5 This line of research overlooks a 3 Some scholars have studied European fiscal history in a purely comparative way. Tilly (1990) and Bonney (1995) provide voluminous qualitative accounts. For an abridged version in this vein, see O'Brien (2001) . More recently, Stasavage (2005) uses econometric techniques to evaluate the politics of sovereign borrowing in Europe from 1274-1785 while Dincecco (2006b) tests the relationship between political regimes and sovereign credit risk from . Also see Van Zanden and Prak (2006) . 4 It is unclear whether institutional changes resulting from the Glorious Revolution actually improved property rights protections. Clark (1996) argues that secure property rights existed in England from at least 1600. Similarly, O'Brien (2001) argues that England implemented the constitutional and administrative structures underlying its fiscal state in the 1640s. 5 Indeed, North and Weingast's work represents a valuable point of departure for many scholars. See, for instance, Frey and Kucher (2000) , Yafeh (2000, 2006) , Quinn (2001) , Stasavage (2003 Stasavage ( , 2005 , Summerhill (2004) , Bogart and Richardson (2006) , and Dincecco (2006a Dincecco ( , 2006b ).
This paper examines the public finance consequences of the political transformations identified by Epstein (2000) and North and Weingast (1989) , performing a systematic cross-country analysis of the effects of political regimes on per-capita revenues collected by European states from 1650 to 1913. By pursuing a rigorous quantitative approach, it intends to complement existing qualitative studies.
In particular, I assemble a panel data set on per-capita revenues for five of the largest and/or most important players in Europe at the time: Britain, France, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Spain. After identifying fiscal centralization and the rise of limited government within European states, I carry out a multivariate regression analysis of the public finance effects of political regimes, controlling for relevant economic and political factors. The results show that both centralized and limited government regimes were associated with significantly higher levels of per-capita revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones, suggesting that political regimes mattered. I supplement the panel regressions with a structural change analysis that assumes no a priori knowledge of possible breaks, revealing close relationships between major turning points in revenues series and political transformations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 dates fiscal centralization and limited government and section 3 characterizes the expected relationships between political regimes and per-capita revenues levels. Section 4 describes the data used and the sample states selected. Section 5 presents suggestive evidence. Section 6 discusses the control variables, section 7 introduces the econometric design, and section 8 presents the panel regression results. Section 9 performs the robustness checks for structural breaks. Section 10 concludes.
Political Transformations in Europe
In 1650, most European states suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule, though by 1913 many of these same states had centralized institutions and limited government. To start, we must distinguish clearly between divided fiscal authority and absolute fiscal discretion. Divided fiscal authority was a problem that encompassed geographical space, involving negotiations over tax revenues between central and local governments. Absolute fiscal discretion was a problem contained within the central government itself, involving interactions between the ruler and organized national bodies like parliament over fiscal policy. 8 Indeed, there was a close link between the two problems before the 19 th century.
Fragmented sovereignty in the form of powerful local assemblies, laws, and notables constrained the predatory capacities of European monarchs, suggesting that divided fiscal authority "limited" absolutist power. 9 Once central and local bodies had struck tax deals, however, rulers had great control over how to spend state funds.
Following North and Weingast's (1989) influential claim that relates budgetary control by parliament to improvements in public finances, my characterization of limited government refers exclusively to the problem of absolute discretion, meaning that a political regime could have been divided in terms of fiscal authority but unlimited in terms of fiscal policy. I will make this definition more explicit in section 2.4. For now, we may say that a state was limited if and only if parliament possessed a regular constitutional right to monitor how the crown spent tax revenues. This standard makes sense because one 8 When necessary, I use the generic term "parliament" to refer to this class of institutions, which took on various names depending on the era and/or state. 9 For overviews, see Hoffman and Norberg (1994 ), 299-310, Bordo and Cortès-Conde (2001 ), 1-9, and O'Brien (2001 important aspect of the paper is to test whether the North and Weingast hypothesis -much cited but not often subject to rigorous quantitative analysis -generally holds. Since governments faced a variety of economic and political constraints, such precision is also necessary, or else many sorts of institutional arrangements could be considered limited. In Spain, the crown had to implement new taxes on top of old ones rather than make much-needed structural changes because tax agreements among (i.e. united) Spanish kingdoms were too difficult. For instance, Bourbon reformers in the early 1700s chose to 10 Dincecco (2006a) performs a cross-country analysis of fragmentation in Europe from 1700-1871, finding that fiscal zones were small because of divided authority through the start of the French Revolution (1789). 11 Brewer (1989 ), 5-7, Velde and Weir (1992 ), 6-8, Hoffman (1994 ), 229-240, Major (1994 ), 60-61, Sargent and Velde (1995 ), 482-485, and White (2001 Defaults occurred in 1713, 1759, and 1770. Never total, nor random in nature, they involved suspension of reimbursement payments in times of crisis, reform that restored high interest rates back to the legal maximum of 5 percent, or repudiation that reduced nominal yields below the legal maximum. See Velde and Weir (1992 ), 5, 8-10, Sargent and Velde (1995 ), 480-491, and White (2001 superimpose an additional tax in Spain's eastern provinces, called the catastro in Catalonia, the contribucìon ùnica in Aragon, and the equivalente in Valencia. As in France, there was regional variation in tax rates dependent upon the bargain made. 
Fiscal Fragmentation

Fiscal Centralization
Fiscal centralization was a centuries-long process that included all of the measures taken to assess and collect tax revenues. In many European countries, however, deep structural changes were imposed during French Revolutionary and Napoleonic times (1789-1815), producing a remarkable difference in the degree of centralization before and after this era.
To make systematic comparisons across states possible, I have chosen a simple definition of fiscal centralization, which occurred the year that the state's central government first secured its revenues through a tax system with uniform rates throughout the country. 15 As shown in With undivided fiscal authority, central governments forced their domains to adhere to standard tax rates, overcoming the free-riding problem caused by fragmentation.
By equalizing taxes at relatively high levels, per-capita revenues rose. It is worth pointing out that -in stark contrast to the previous century -no French defaults occurred during the 1800s, suggesting that fiscal centralization reduced the relative attractiveness of this option by enabling the state to raise enough in revenues.
Absolutism
Even in absolutist regimes where monarchs spent funds as they wished, parliamentary bodies exercised authority in tax matters, prompting rulers to seek alternative resources through fiscal predation. Such strategies were not simply a response of Confederation, Congress could only request such funds. States maintained the ability to levy taxes after 1788, however. See Edling (2003) . 16 Also see Godechot, Hyslop, and Dowd (1971) . 17 Upon taking power in 1789, the National Assembly transformed the French tax system, eliminating old privileges and exemptions. After his coup in 1799, Napoleon completed the process of tax rationalization. See White (1991), 314-316, and White (1995), 234-241, 250-252. 18 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2004) , 40-51. 19 Godechot, Hyslop, and Dowd (1971) , and Kiser and Schneider (1994 North and Weingast (1989 ), 809-812, Velde and Weir (1992 ), 6, Hoffman and Norberg (1994 , and Sacks (1994), 37-44, 53-65. Dutch tax base and Europe remained politically stable, Willem found it difficult to balance the national accounts. Under his reign, the public debt increased from roughly 575 million florins in 1814 to 900 million florins in 1830 and 1200 million florins in 1840, amounting to more than 200 percent of GDP, a debt ratio comparable to that of war-ridden Napoleonic times. Partly in response to the excesses of fiscal absolutism, limited government -which I examine more closely in the following section -emerged in the Netherlands in the 1840s.
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In the absence of constitutional constraints, parliaments rightfully feared that kings would spend additional funds granted to them in reckless and wasteful ways. They therefore demanded fiscal limits as a precondition to provide new revenues. Unwilling to bow to such requests, rulers often resorted to predatory fiscal tactics. For these reasons, individuals resisted tax requests more fervently, suggesting that per-capita revenues collected by central governments remained low.
Limited Government
As Tilly's (1990) categories of "capital" versus "coercion." All are coded at 150-year intervals. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson use two measures: Polity IV categories of executive constraints and categories of "protection for capital," each coded at 100-year (1000-1700) or 50-year (1700-1850) intervals. Since the Polity IV data set does not begin until the 19 th century, the authors assign their own values beforehand. All of the computations use 40-year windows around each date (e.g. the 1800 value is the average of 1780, 1790, 1800, 1810, and 1820), however, reducing the precision of individual point estimates. Jaggers and Marshall's Polity IV project classifies executive constraints for states at yearly intervals from 1800-2004. Their scale ranges from 1-7, where 1 = unlimited executive authority, 3 = slight to moderate limits on executive authority, 5 = substantial limits on executive authority, and 7 = executive subordination. Values 2, 4, and 6 represent intermediate categories. To map the Polity IV scale into my classification system, I interpret values 1-4 as "absolutist" and 5-7 as "limited." For additional details, please see appendix 1. 23 I have not made use of suffrage measures to identify limited government regimes since I am concerned with effective checks on executive power rather than democracy per se.
Netherlands, replete with a new constitution, did not emerge until the Year of Revolutions in 1848, however. Most importantly, the Dutch crown had to submit annual budgets to parliament for approval, which in the words of Van Zanden and Van Riel (2004) Table 1 indicates that in general the limited government political transformation began to take place during the 1830s and 1840s, several decades after fiscal centralization.
As mentioned, the major exceptions were England, which became limited nearly 150 years prior to any of the Continental states, and Spain, where it did not emerge until 1876
following decades of failed constitutional initiatives. For additional details, please refer to appendix 1.
Limited government strengthened parliament's right to levy taxes and reduced the ruler's ability to violate private rights to financial property. Parliament also controlled the state's purse strings, reducing the likelihood of poor fiscal choices by the ruler. In light of these twin developments, investors were more willing to purchase public debt at lower rates of interest. Hence, per-capita revenues rose.
24 Fritschy and Van Der Voort (1997), 73-77, 85-87, and Van Riel (2004), 32-51, 85-90, 96-110, 171-178 . 25 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's two measures classify the Netherlands as 4 (slight to moderate limits on executive authority/some merchant rights) in 1800 and 5 or 6 (substantial limits on executive authority/effective parliamentary representation) in 1850. The authors use 40-year averages around each date to compute values, however, reducing the precision of their point estimates. Jaggers and Marshall's Polity IV yearly measure of executive constraints characterize the Netherlands as 1 (unlimited executive authority) from 1815-1839, 3 (slight to moderate limits on executive authority) from 1840-1847, 5 or 6 (substantial limits on executive authority) from 1848-1888, and 7 (executive subordination) from 1889-1913. Before discussing the yield data, it is worthwhile to mention some other points about the dating of political regimes. To bias against my hypothesis, I have always chosen the earliest possible year to define political regimes as either centralized or limited. Since percapita revenues generally grew from the 17 th to the 20 th centuries, average revenue levels associated with both centralized and limited regimes will be lower than otherwise, meaning that the results will be more robust if I still find that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher per-capita revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones.
To illustrate, one might argue that limited government did not truly emerge in During the 19 th century, limited government on the Continent was also susceptible to political upheaval, which I control for in the econometrics portion of the paper. For now, it is enough to recall that my definition ensures a minimum standard for stability by requiring that parliament's constitutional veto power held for at least two consecutive decades. It would not only be impractical to require that limited government was a "permanent" reform, but for reasons described above, pushing back the dates for limited government would likely reinforce any results that centralized and limited regimes led to improvements in public finances. Table 2 provides a summary of the public finance characteristics of the three possible political regimes: fragmented and absolutist, centralized and absolutist, and 26 Jackson (1974), 143-144, 150-151, and Price (1993), 157-165, 177-179, 188-191. 27 to a centralized and absolutist one, revenues were nearly halved from pre-1795 levels to 31 The province greatly increased its collection of per-capita revenues in the years following fiscal centralization, suggesting that this reform reduced free-riding in Holland. See t' Hart (1989 ), 666-670, t'Hart (1997 ), 14-16, Fritschy (2003 ), 67-74, and Van Zanden and Prak (2006 To provide a credible commitment to repay debts, ruling elites invested heavily in government debts, aligning lender and borrower incentives. See t'Hart (1989), 678-679, Fritschy and Van Der Voort (1997 ), 70-75, 92, t'Hart (1997 ), 17-27, and Van Zanden and Van Riel (2004 Another factor affecting public revenues may have been international and domestic political conflicts. Ferguson (2006) claims that through 1880 political events mattered more to investors than economic ones because there was a greater amount of regular information available about them, arguing that both wars and revolutions decreased tax revenues. Yafeh (2000, 2006) also find that financial markets responded 37 Adherence to rigorous standards like those of the classic gold era was uncommon before 1850. Indeed, Mertens (1944) and Morys (2006) As a last point, we must remember that the analysis biases against finding any significant relationship between political regimes and public revenues by assuming that it is in fact possible to neatly disentangle such regimes from economic factors and political conflicts, though theory suggests that they influenced all of these factors. 
Implications for Political Regimes
Suggestive Evidence
Estimating the Effect of Political Regimes
As Ferguson and Schularick (2006) I look to the coefficients on dummy variables for centralized and absolutist regimes and centralized and limited ones relative to fragmented and/or absolutist regimes to estimate the effect of political regime type on resulting per-capita revenues levels. Recall from the introduction that -though fiscal reforms in Europe occurred gradually over time -an influential strand of the historical literature highlights two distinct structural transformations: fiscal centralization and limited government. I do not wish to estimate the magnitudes of public revenues changes in the weeks and months following such institutional changes, but rather to capture steady-state yield levels associated with different sorts of political regimes. The dummy variable approach is well suited for the present inquiry because it provides a clear and simple method to do so. Though it might also be useful to run the same set of regressions from 1650 to 1799, thereby reducing the impact of the Industrial Revolution, the vast majority of regime shifts occurred during the 1800s, making this approach impractical. A second glance at the transformations that occurred prior to the 19 th century proves helpful in this regard, however. To start, recall from section 5 that -as figure 1 depicts -per-capita revenues increased dramatically in the years that followed fiscal centralization in France in 1790.
Econometric Evidence
Another look at the Dutch case is also valuable, since the Netherlands was the only sample state for which there was a shift from a centralized and limited regime "back" to an absolutist one. Figure 2 suggests a sharp drop in per-capita revenues associated with this political change, which occurred at the start of the 1800s. The British case is also instructive. Figure 3 , which plots annual per-capita revenues over political regimes in
Britain from 1650 to 1750, indicates that revenues roughly doubled in the years following the establishment of limited government in 1688. In total, the pre-1800 evidence further suggests that political regimes had important effects on central government revenues that were independent of per-capita income growth associated with the Industrial Revolution.
Structural Breaks Analysis
Though the political transformations that I have identified correspond with exogenously given historical events, they are endogenous in the sense that I have chosen the precise years to mark regimes as centralized and as limited. As an additional robustness check, I thus employ an alternative specification in the spirit of Willard, Guinnane, and Rosen (1996) , Brown and Burdekin (2000) , Sussman and Yafeh (2000) , and Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2002) that assumes no a priori knowledge of possible breaks in the revenues series for sample states.
The procedure, based on Bai and Perron (2003) , identifies multiple structural changes in means while allowing for serial correlation. It selects a maximum number of "best" breaks subject to a minimum number of observations between data segments. 41 As Willard, Guinnane, and Rosen (1996) There is a similar lack of data in Spain from 1789 to 1812. I thus restrict structural tests to the best two breaks over the 19 th century, when both Spanish political transformations occurred. Table 7 indicates a turning point (1846) following fiscal centralization (1844). We also observe a loose relationship between the break that occurred in 1866 and the establishment of limited government (1876).
Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between political regimes and public revenues in European states from 1650 to 1913. Fiscal centralization resolved the problem of local tax free-riding by granting undivided fiscal authority to central governments. Limited government enabled states to make credible commitments to sound policies by reducing the fiscal discretion of rulers. The results indicate that political regimes mattered. I find significant increases in per-capita revenues levels associated with both centralized and limited government regimes relative to fragmented and absolutist ones, even after controlling for economic factors and political risks. Structural breaks tests that assume no a priori knowledge of possible turning points in the revenues series reinforce these findings.
The significant level increases in per-capita revenues that we observe after limited government indicate that European states faced serious problems of private information. In this sense, the results concur with the conventional wisdom that limited government counts by enabling rulers to make a credible commitment to sound fiscal policies. Yet the findings also highlight the role of fiscal centralization. States are not necessarily born strong, as much of the current literature assumes. Indeed, fragmentation within European states created just as many headaches as absolutism, suggesting that centralization is also necessary to develop efficient systems of public finance.
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Appendix 1. Political Regimes
I define fiscal centralization to have occurred the year in which the state's central government secured its revenues through a tax system with uniform rates throughout the country. Similarly, I define limited government to have emerged the year in which parliament gained the stable constitutional right to control the state's annual budget. To meet my criteria, parliament's power had to hold for at least two consecutive decades. For additional details, please see section 2 of the text.
England (Britain).
45 Fiscal centralization occurred during medieval times in England: both Brewer (1989) and Sacks (1994) argue that England possessed strong, national institutions by the end of the 12 th century. I thereby date fiscal centralization to the arrival of the Normans (1066), which greatly contributed to the establishment of uniform rule by undercutting provincial authority. Following North and Weingast (1989) , the Glorious Revolution (1688) established parliament's power of the purse, granting it a regular veto over state expenditures along with the right to monitor crown spending. 46 My characterization of the rise of limited government in England also matches up closely with the ways in which De Long and Shleifer (1993), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) , and Jaggers and Marshall (2005) have coded political regimes and transitions there. 47 For additional details, please see sections 1 and 2 of the text.
France. Please see text, sections 2 and 5.
The Netherlands. Please see text, sections 2 and 5.
Prussia. Following French defeat in the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806, the Prussian government hastened to carry out economic and political reforms, including fiscal centralization. 48 Pressure to furnish a liberal constitution grew over the first half of the 19 th century. It was granted by King Freidrich Wilhelm IV during the Year of Revolutions in 1848. As elsewhere on the Continent, the young constitutional regime was imperfect. In the 1860s, for instance, the Prussian government operated without legislative approval of the military budget. Brewer (1989), 3-7, 143-154, and Sacks (1994), 14-23 . Note that O'Brien (2001) makes a convincing argument that the crucial juncture in English financial history was the civil war of the 1640s rather than the Glorious Revolution. Also see Clark (1996) , who claims that secure property rights existed in England from at least 1600. The panel data set does not begin until 1750, however, a point by which there is widespread agreement that England possessed a centralized and limited regime. 47 De Long and Shleifer's three measures characterize England as a constitutional monarchy from 1650-1800. Their coding system makes use of a 150-year interval, however, reducing the precision of their estimates. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's two measures classify it as 3 (slight to moderate limits on executive authority/some merchant rights) in 1600, 5 or 6 (substantial limits on executive authority/effective parliamentary representation) in 1700, 1750 and 1800, and 7 (executive subordination/government formed by middle class) in 1850. Jaggers and Marshall's Polity IV yearly measure of executive constraints characterize England as 7 (executive subordination) from 1800-1913. 48 Even prior to fiscal centralization, contemporaries considered the Prussian tax system one of the most efficient in Europe. See Kiser and Schneider (1994) . 49 Tilly (1966), 486-493, Godechot, Hyslop, and Dowd (1971) , Woolf (1991), and Breuilly (2003), 131-132. 50 Indeed, Jaggers and Marshall's Polity IV yearly measure of executive constraints characterize Prussia as 1 or 2 (unlimited executive authority) from 1800-1805 and 1813-1858, 3 or 4 (slight to moderate limits on executive authority) from 1859-1866 and 1871-1908, and 5 (substantial limits on executive authority) from 1909-1913. Years 1806-1812 are considered as interruption periods and 1867-1870 as transition ones. For reasons described in section 2.4 of the text, I date the emergence of a limited regime in Prussia to 1848, however.
Germany as a whole rather than Prussia. However, my characterization of the rise of limited government corresponds reasonably well with their codes for political regimes and transitions there.
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Spain. In the early 1700s, Bourbon reformers strengthened the power of the central government in Castile, imposing new taxes on Spain's eastern provinces. Tax rates varied across regions, however, depending upon the particular bargain made. Thus, I view the Bourbon tax reforms as another example of tax particularism rather than fiscal centralization. 52 Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, attempting to convert it into a satellite state. The French did little to generate modern laws and administrative practices, however. Fiscal centralization did not occur until 1844 amidst a "moderate" decade of institutional reforms. From 1808 to 1876, civil unrest created political chaos in Spain. After decades of failed constitutional initiatives, a stable variant of constitutional monarchy was established in 1876, lasting until a military coup in 1923. 53 My characterization of the rise of limited government in Spain also corresponds well with the ways in which De Long and Shleifer (1993), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) and Jaggers and Marshall (2005) have coded political regimes and transitions there.
54 For a list of 19 th century Spanish revolutions, coups, and civil wars, please see appendix 3. 51 De Long and Shleifer's three measures characterize Germany as absolutist from 1650-1800. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's two measures classify it as 1 (unlimited executive authority/no effective capital protection) in 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800, and 1850. 52 As Tortella (2000) writes, "Attempts to modernize public finance go back to the 18 th century, with the plan for a single tax (contribucìon ùnica) of the Marques de la Ensenada. But a century later things were even worse. Until 1845 the Spanish taxation system was a disorganized and unsystematic mosaic… (174)." For additional details, please see section 2.1 of the text. 53 Carr (1966 ), Vicens Vive (1969 , Lynch (1989) , Tortella (2000), 27-32, 173-192, and Tortella and Comìn (2001), 155-165. 54 De Long and Shleifer's three measures characterize Spain as absolutist from 1650-1800. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's two measures classify it as 1 or 2 (unlimited executive authority/no effective capital protection) in 1600, 1700, 1750, and 1800 and 4 (slight to moderate limits on executive authority/some merchant rights) in 1850. The authors use 40-year averages around each date to compute values, however, reducing the precision of their point estimates. Jaggers and Marshall's Polity IV yearly measure of executive constraints characterize Spain as 1 or 2 (unlimited executive authority) from 1800-1807, 1814-1819, 1823-1835, 1853-1867, and 1873, 3 or 4 (slight to moderate limits on executive authority) from 1820-1822 and 1846-1851, 5 (substantial limits on executive authority) from 1830-1852, and 7 (executive subordination) from 1837 -1844 , 1871 -1872 , and 1876 -1913 . Years 1808 -1813 are considered as interruption periods and 1836, 1868-1870, and 1874-1875 as transition ones.
Appendix 2. Data Sources
Revenues figures concern income from taxation collected by central governments. Loan income has been subtracted whenever possible. Intermediate years for revenues and populations were linearly interpolated. For additional details, please see section 4 of the text.
England (Britain). REV1 is total revenue to the English crown, 1650 -1824 , from O'Brien (1995 . REV2 is net receipts of the public income for Great Britain, 1692 -1801 , from Mitchell (1988 . REV3 is central government revenue for Great Britain, 1750-1801, and for the United Kingdom, 1802 -1913 , from Mitchell (2003 . The series of British central government revenues from 1650 -1913 consists of REV1: 1650 -1691 REV2: 1692 REV2: -1749 REV3: 1750 REV3: -1913 . Years 1654 and 1660 have been interpolated. POP1 is population of England, from Mitchell (1988), 7-8. 55 POP2 is population of Wales for 1701 , 1751 , 1781 , 1801 , 1831 , from Deane and Cole (1967 , 103. POP3 is population of Scotland. The 1650 figure is from De Vries (1984) , 36; the 1701 figure from Brown (1991) , 33; and the 1755 figure from Mitchell (1988) , 8. POP5 is the estimated mid-year home population of the British Isles, from Mitchell (1988), 11-13 . The British population series from 1650-1913 consists of POP1: 1650-1691; POP1 + POP2: 1692-1700; POP1 + POP2 + POP3: 1701-1800; POP5: 1801-1913. 56 The British official price of gold is given in pounds per fine ounce, 1650-1717, and the London market price of gold in pounds per fine ounce, 1718-1913, are taken from Officer (2006) . 57 With the exception of French Revolutionary and Napoleonic times, both series are nearly identical.
France. REV1 is ordinary revenues of the French monarchy, 1650-1695, from Bonney (1995b) . REV2 is total royal revenue in France from various sources converted into livres tournois, 1660-1775, from Bonney (1995c) . REV3 is French ordinary revenue, 1727-1814, from Bonney (1995d) . REV4 is French revenue, 1650-1870, courtesy of Francois Velde. REV5 is ordinary central government revenue, 1815 -1913 , from Mitchell (2003 . REV6 is extraordinary central government revenue, 1815-1890, from Annuaire Statistique (1966) . The series of French central government revenues from 1650 -1913 consists of REV1: 1650 -1656 , 1662 REV2: 1661 REV2: -1703 REV2: , 1705 REV2: -1715 REV2: , 1727 REV2: -1750 REV2: , 1757 REV2: -1758 REV2: , 1761 REV2: , 1763 REV2: , 1773 REV2: -1774 REV3: 1751 REV3: -1754 REV3: , 1764 REV3: -1765 REV3: , 1768 REV3: , 1780 REV3: -1781 REV3: , 1788 REV3: -1796 REV3: , 1806 REV3: -1813 REV4: 1716 REV4: -1726 REV4: , 1759 REV4: -1760 REV4: , 1766 REV4: -1767 REV4: , 1769 REV4: , 1772 REV4: , 1775 REV4: -1779 REV4: , 1782 REV4: -1787 REV4: , 1791 REV4: -1793 REV4: , 1796 REV4: -1805 REV4: , 1814 REV5 + REV6: 1815 -1890 REV5: 1891 -1913 . Years 1657 -1660 , 1755 -1756 , 1762 , and 1770-1771 have been interpolated. POP1 is population of France from Dupaquier (1988), volume 2, 60. POP2 is population of France from Mathias and O'Brien (1977) . POP3 is population of France from Blayo and Henry (1975), 97 . POP4 is population of France at censuses from Mitchell (2003) . The French population series from 1650 -1913 consists of POP1: 1650 , 1670 , 1680 , 1690 , 1710 POP2: 1715 POP2: , 1725 POP2: , 1730 POP2: , 1735 POP3: 1740 POP3: , 1745 POP3: , 1750 POP3: , 1755 POP3: , 1760 POP3: , 1765 POP3: , 1770 POP3: , 1775 POP3: -1776 POP3: , 1780 POP3: -1781 POP3: , 1785 POP3: -1786 POP3: , 1790 POP3: -1791 POP3: , 1795 POP3: -1796 POP3: , 1800 POP3: -1801 POP3: , 1805 POP3: -1806 POP3: , 1810 POP3: -1811 POP3: , 1815 POP3: -1816 POP3: , 1820 POP3: -1821 POP3: , 1825 POP3: -1826 POP3: , 1830 POP3: -1831 POP3: , 1835 POP3: -1836 POP3: , 1840 POP3: -1841 POP3: , 1845 POP3: -1846 POP3: , 1850 POP3: -1851 These figures do not include Wales. See Wrigley and Schofield (1981), 10. 56 We must distinguish between institutional innovations in England itself and for Britain as a whole. To control for such differences, I use the population for the relevant political entities when calculating per-capita figures. As discussed in appendix 1, Acts of Union assimilated England with Wales in 1536, with Scotland in 1707, and with Ireland in 1800. From 1650-1691, revenues data for the English crown is used, since British data is unavailable. To convert into per-capita terms, I divide by only the English population. Due to data unavailability, neither Wales nor Scotland is included, though at the time the English crown collected revenues from both domains. By making the pre-1692 population denominator smaller than it actually was, both decisions bias against the hypotheses that limited government resulted in an increase in revenues . Revenues data are for Great Britain (i.e., England, Scotland, and Wales) from 1692-1801 and for the United Kingdom (i.e. Great Britain and Ireland) from . Accordingly, population figures are used for England, Scotland, and Wales from 1692 -1801 , and England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland from 1802 -1913 British revenues in ounces of gold were transformed into revenues in grams of gold by multiplying by 28.35, since 1 ounce = 28.35 grams. 1855 -1856 , 1860 -1861 POP4: 1866 POP4: , 1872 POP4: , 1876 POP4: , 1881 POP4: , 1886 POP4: , 1891 POP4: , 1896 POP4: , 1901 POP4: , 1906 POP4: , 1911 . All other years have been interpolated.
The Paris market price of gold in francs per gram, , is courtesy of Jean-Laurent Rosenthal.
The Netherlands. Due to data unavailability, public revenues for the Dutch Republic have been culled from Holland, 1719-1794. 58 For additional details, please see section 5 of the text. REV1 is public revenue in Holland, 1668 -1794 , from Fritschy, Horlings, Liesker, and Van Der Ent (1995 . REV2 is income of the Batavian Republic and its successors, 1803 -1810 , 1814 , from Van Zanden and Van Riel (2004 , 49. REV3 is income during the reign of Willem I, 1814 , 1821 , 1826 , 1831 , 1836 , 1840 , from Van Zanden and Van Riel (2004 Vries (1984) , 36. POP3 is population of the Netherlands from Mitchell (2003) . The Dutch population series from 1650 -1913 consists of POP1: 1650 -1794 POP2: 1800; POP3: 1816 POP3: , 1829 POP3: , 1839 POP3: , 1849 POP3: , 1859 POP3: , 1869 POP3: , 1879 POP3: , 1889 POP3: , 1899 POP3: , 1909 Prussia. REV1 is net revenues, 1688-1806, from Korner (1995) . For 1688-1713, revenues figures are derived from the military treasury only. REV2 is total ordinary revenues, 1807 -1913 , from Mauersberg (1988 , 125. The series of Prussian central government revenues from 1688 -1913 consists of REV1: 1688 -1806 REV2: 1821 REV2: , 1829 REV2: , 1841 REV2: , 1847 REV2: , 1850 REV2: , 1855 REV2: , 1860 REV2: , 1867 REV2: , 1868 REV2: , 1870 REV2: , 1874 REV2: , 1875 REV2: , 1880 REV2: , 1885 REV2: , 1890 REV2: , 1900 REV2: , 1905 REV2: , 1910 . All other years have been interpolated. POP1 is population of Prussia courtesy of Peter Brecke. Note that these figures incorporate Prussian territorial changes over the 17 th to 19 th centuries as best as possible. POP2 is population of Prussia from Mauersberg (1988) , 127. The Prussian population series from 1650 -1913 consists of POP1: 1688 -1865 POP2: 1870 POP2: , 1874 POP2: , 1875 POP2: , 1880 POP2: , 1885 POP2: , 1890 POP2: , 1895 POP2: , 1900 POP2: , 1905 POP2: , 1910 . All other years have been linearly interpolated.
I have converted Prussian revenues into grams of gold from 1688-1913 as follows. Thaler units were first transformed into silver ones by multiplying by 16.667. 59 I then transformed revenues from silver units to gold ones by dividing by the silver for gold price ratio found in Officer (2006) . Lastly, I divided by the Prussian population to find per-capita revenues in grams of gold. Note that revenues were given in marks from 1857-1913, where one mark was worth one-third of a thaler following de Vanssay (1999) . Hence, for this period I transformed mark units into thaler ones by dividing by 3 before proceeding through the steps just described.
Spain. REV1 is ordinary and extraordinary revenues, 1703, 1713, Lynch (1989) , 61. REV2 is ordinary and extraordinary revenue categories to the Spanish crown, 1753-1788, from Gelabert (1995) . REV3 is Ingresos Totales del Estado, 1801-1842, Carreras and Tafunell (2006) . REV4 is Derechos Reconocidos y Liquidados Totales, 1845 -1913 , Carreras and Tafunell (2006 Lynch (1989), 8, 116-117 . POP4 is population of Spain from Mitchell (2003) . The Spanish population series from 1650 -1913 consists of POP1: 1650 , 1700 , 1850 POP2: 1750 POP2: , 1787 POP3: 1717 POP3: , 1797 POP4: 1768 POP4: , 1857 POP4: , 1860 POP4: , 1877 POP4: , 1887 POP4: , 1897 POP4: , 1900 POP4: , 1910 POP4: , 1920 . All other years have been interpolated.
The Spanish market price of gold or silver is not available over the 16 th to 19 th centuries because buying and selling bullion outside the Spanish mint was forbidden. 60 Hence, I have converted Spanish revenues into grams of gold as follows. First, the pounds for pesos exchange rate was transformed into pounds for pesetas by multiplying by 5. 61 Second, revenues in pesetas were transformed into revenues in pounds by dividing by this exchange rate. Third, revenues in pounds were transformed into revenues in grams of gold by dividing by the market price of gold in ounces. Fourth, revenues in ounces of gold were transformed into revenues in grams of gold by multiplying by 28.35, since 1 ounce = 28.35 grams. Lastly, I have divided by the Spanish population to find per-capita revenues in grams of gold.
Appendix 3. Regression Variables
For additional details, please see sections 6, 7, and 8 of the text.
Dependent variable 1 is the ratio of annual per-capita revenues to urbanization rates. Please see below for additional details about the urbanization variable.
Dependent variable 2 is the ratio of annual per-capita revenues to Maddison's (2003) per-capita GDP figures. Please see below for additional details about the per-capita GDP variable.
The dummy variable for fragmented and absolutist political regimes takes a value of 1 for each year that a sample state possessed a fragmented and absolutist regime from 1650-1913. The dummy variable for centralized and absolutist political regimes takes a value of 1 for each year that a sample state possessed a centralized and absolutist regime from In the literature on the classic gold standard era, there are discrepancies in adoption dates due to the use of different definitions. The gold variable dummy variable takes a value of 1 for each year that a state was on gold according to Meissner (2002) , who takes a strict measure of gold adherence that selects the year in which a currency became de facto and de jure convertible into gold by law. Britain was the first country to go on a de facto gold standard in 1717. However, it was not until 1774 that silver's legal tender property was restricted and not until 1816 that the gold standard was formally adopted. In 1821, Britain returned to de facto gold convertibility. Many other states were legally bimetal, though effectively silver, through the 1840s. Of these, France was the most important: the bimetallic standard was established there in 1803. The Netherlands was also legally bimetal until 1849, when it formally switched to silver. German states such as Prussia were on a silver standard. In Spain, competing monetary systems coexisted until 1848, when bimetallism was legally established. The 1848 law was a failure, however, and another attempt was taken in 1868. Unlike most other European states, Spain was a "shadow" rather than official member of the gold standard. It suspended gold convertibility of Spanish banknotes in 1883, becoming one of the few remaining silver standard countries. Britain: gold, 1821 -1913 . France: gold, 1878 -1913 . Netherlands: gold, 1875 -1913 . Prussia/Germany: gold, 1872 -1913 No gold standard from 1870-1913. For sources, see Redish (1995 ), 718, Flandreau (1996 ), 862, Jonker (1997 ), 95-98, Tortella (2000 , 158-161, 202-205, Officer (2001) , Meissner (2002), 7, and Morys (2006), 38-44. 62 Due to a dearth of data, I have used German urbanization and population figures for Prussia from 1750-1913. 63 Also see Hohenberg and Lees (1985) and Bairoch (1988) . 64 As for the urbanization variable, a lack of data has led me to substitute Maddison's (2003) German percapita GDP figures for Prussia. The "Sign" column indicates whether the difference in mean per-capita revenues-to-GDP ratios is positive or negative over the 20 years following the structural break in question as compared to the 20 years preceding it. For additional details, please see section 9 of the text. 
